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INFORMED TRADING AND
CYBERSECURITY BREACHES*
JOSHUA MITTS†
ERIC TALLEY‡
Cybersecurity has become a significant concern in corporate and commercial settings, and for good reason: a threatened or realized cybersecurity breach
can materially affect firm value for capital investors. This paper explores
whether market arbitrageurs appear systematically to exploit advance knowledge of such vulnerabilities. We make use of a novel data set tracking cybersecurity breach announcements among public companies to study trading
patterns in the derivatives market preceding the announcement of a breach. Using a matched sample of unaffected control firms, we find significant trading
abnormalities for hacked targets, measured in terms of both open interest and
volume. Our results are robust to several alternative matching techniques, as
well as to both cross-sectional and longitudinal identification strategies. All
told, our findings appear strongly consistent with the proposition that arbitrageurs can and do obtain early notice of impending breach disclosures, and
that they are able to profit from such information. Normatively, we argue that
the efficiency implications of cybersecurity trading are distinct—and generally
more concerning—than those posed by garden-variety information trading
within securities markets. Notwithstanding these idiosyncratic concerns, however, both securities fraud and computer fraud in their current form appear
poorly adapted to address such concerns, and both would require nontrivial reimagining to meet the challenge (even approximately).
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INTRODUCTION
The ascendancy and impact of the information economy during the last
quarter century have been dramatic and unprecedented. Fully one fifth of the
preeminent Dow Jones Industrial Index in the mid-1990s was composed of
Eastman Kodak, Bethlehem Steel, F.W. Woolworth, International Paper,
Sears Roebuck and Union Carbide. Amazon and Google were little-known
startups. Apple Computer—which didn’t make the cut—was a moribund upstart from the 1980s; Facebook and Bitcoin were still a decade away from
inception. How times have ever changed. The digitization of the world’s
economy has hastened profound changes in commerce, record-keeping, law
enforcement, personnel policy, banking, insurance, securities markets, and
virtually all aspects of services and manufacturing sectors.
And yet, a key pillar of the digital economy—the ease of accessing,
copying, and distributing information at scale—is also frequently its Achilles’ heel, in the form of cybersecurity risk. The massive and cataclysmic data
breach of Equifax in September 2017, for example, which compromised
highly confidential information (including Social Security numbers) of tens
of millions of clients, was hardly the first of its kind, nor will it be the last.
For more than a decade, firms and organizations that store confidential data
digitally have been targets (potential or actual) of similar types of attacks,
often with analogously cataclysmic implications for victims.
Within securities market settings, of course, one person’s catastrophe
can be another’s arbitrage opportunity. And so it came to be in the late summer of 2016, when Muddy Waters Capital—a well-known short hedge
fund—opened a confidential line of communication with MedSec, a start-up
cybersecurity firm claiming to have discovered a serious security software
flaw in the pacemakers produced by St. Jude Medical, a then-public medical
device company (knee-deep in the process of being acquired by Abbot Laboratories).1 Only after taking a substantial short position in St. Jude did
Muddy Waters publicly disclose the device’s vulnerability,2 causing an immediate fall in St. Jude’s stock price of about eight percent.3 Similar patterns
1
Matthew Goldstein et al., Unusual Pairing Makes Public Bet vs. Pacemakers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2016, at B1–B2.
2
See id. at B1.
3
Michelle Celarier, Muddy Waters Ends 2016 with a Big Gain, INSTITUTIONAL INV., Jan.
13, 2017, https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1505q7kzxzsyg/muddy-waters-ends2016-with-a-big-gain (“St. Jude’s initially dropped 8 percent on Block’s August 25 short call
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of material changes in value after disclosure of a cybersecurity event are
now commonplace.
Muddy Waters’ securities market play around St. Jude’s data breach disclosure is perhaps unsurprising—particularly when: (1) cybersecurity
breaches can have profound price effects in capital markets; and (2) the underlying vulnerability involved potentially confidential data. Trading in the
securities of compromised issuers is, after all, far safer than trafficking directly in the stolen information itself. Indeed, fencing such protected data
directly is almost always a criminal offence under state and federal law.4 In
contrast, buying low and selling high (or selling high and buying low) in
securities markets is a venerated ritual of capitalism. At the same time, the
St. Jude-Muddy Waters kerfuffle raises intriguing questions about how widespread such cybersecurity-related trading is, whether material arbitrage rents
are available, and who tends to earn them. And, to the extent that appreciable arbitrage rents exist, might they directly or indirectly subsidize cyberhacking—effectively catalyzing destructive activity solely for the purpose of
trading on the basis of the harms and risks it creates? Is it possible to detect
such activities by observing the footprint of trading patterns? Should such
coordinated behavior be more heavily regulated by authorities?
In this paper, we consider public company announcements of cybersecurity breaches, analyzing how they interact with securities market trading
activity. Specifically, we study securities market trading plausibly on the
basis of advance knowledge of a cybersecurity breach (“informed cybertrading”). Conceptually, such information arbitrage opportunities are eminently possible, and privately informed traders can typically exploit their
information so long as there is sufficient independent market activity (for
example, among liquidity or noise traders) to provide “cover” for the informed arbitrageur.5 Thus, informed traders can have strong incentives to
take short positions against the hacked firms—positions that should be detectable in securities market activity. We test this proposition empirically,
making use of a novel data set of corporate data breaches involving publicly
traded companies. Using a variety of means to match breached firms against
comparators with no announced vulnerabilities, we find significant trading
abnormalities in the put option market for hacked firms, measured both
through open interest and trading volume. Our results, moreover, appear robust to a variety of matching techniques as well as to cross-sectional and
time-series analyses. We view these results as consistent with the proposition
but recovered slightly as its announced deal with Abbott Laboratories looked more certain.”)
To take a current example, Uber’s recent disclosure of a cybersecurity loss of client payment
records caused an outside investor (SoftBank) to reduce its valuation assessment of Uber by
nearly a third. See Leslie Hook & Richard Waters, SoftBank Share Purchase Discounts Uber
by 30%, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 28, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/2a2131e0-d3ef11e7-a303-9060cb1e5f44.
4
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A, 1030 (2018); infra Part IV.
5
Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 56 ECONOMETRICA 1315-1335
(Nov. 1985) (showing how informed trader disguises information in noisy order flow).
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that arbitrageurs tend to have early notice of impending cybersecurity breach
disclosures, and that they trade on the basis of that information.
Although our principal focus is positive and empirical in nature, our
findings also hold relevance for larger normative debates about whether such
trading practices warrant additional legal proscription. Normatively, the debate over how (or whether) securities law should regulate informed trading
is complex, balancing concerns over price discovery, liquidity, and allocative efficiency. Informed cyber-trading shares many of these traits, but it
also tees up other idiosyncratic efficiency concerns. If significant arbitrage
rents from advance knowledge of cybersecurity risks were wholly undeterred, several inefficient investment distortions plausibly follow, both by hackers6 (including cybersecurity firms) whose efforts tend to publicize and
exacerbate vulnerabilities that would otherwise remain unobserved, and by
issuers themselves—anxious to expend efforts to frustrate or divert hackers’
attention. Moreover, the redistributive profits obtained via these trading opportunities may incentivize hackers to exploit security vulnerabilities, leading to greater dissemination of stolen personal information, impersonation,
and identity theft. These represent real economic costs, which are largely
absent in garden-variety information-trading contexts. Consequently, we argue, informed cyber-trading plausibly justifies enhanced legal scrutiny of
those who profit from the activity.
Nevertheless, several variations of informed cyber-trading appear to be
perfectly legal under current law. To be sure, it is almost certainly unlawful
for parties to conspire to steal proprietary information from a firm, or to
spread false information about a cybersecurity risk in order to manipulate
stock prices. That said, if such parties were simply to use computer queries
to access, discover, trade upon, and then expose bona fide cybersecurity vulnerabilities (as Muddy Waters and MedSec were alleged to have done), they
would face little scrutiny under current law. They would not violate market
manipulation proscriptions, which require the introduction of “inaccurate
information into the market.”7 Nor would they appear to run afoul of received insider trading theories, which still require the breach of a confidential or fiduciary relationship (though courts are actively revisiting this
requirement as of the date of writing).8 Perhaps a better match on liability
6

See infra Part IV.
SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (emphasis added).
8
See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). Several federal courts have
recently contemplated an extension to insider trading doctrine to reach (so-called) “outsider
traders”—informed traders who are neither corporate fiduciaries nor have breached a confidential relationship, but who use deceptive means to hack into another’s computer system. See,
e.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[M]isrepresenting one’s identity in
order to gain access to information that is otherwise off limits, and then stealing that information is plainly ‘deceptive’ within the ordinary meaning of the word. . ..[D]epending on how the
hacker gained access, it . . . could be, by definition, a ‘deceptive device or contrivance’ that is
prohibited by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5.”). Nevertheless, no court to our knowledge has
firmly embraced this expansion to date. We discuss this nascent strand of case law (sometimes
referred to as “outsider trading”). See infra Part IV.
7

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\9-1\HLB103.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 5

Informed Trading and Cybersecurity Breaches

5-NOV-19

9:40

5

grounds would be the provisions of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA), which (notwithstanding its name) does not require a showing of
intent to defraud in order to trigger liability.9 But the CFAA remains relatively untested in these contexts, and its remedies provisions are generally
limited to concrete remediation costs.10 In short, the task of redesigning law
to address the costs of informed cyber-trading is a sizable ask, posing a difficult prospective challenge for policy makers and regulators alike.
Our analysis contributes to a growing literature on cyber-security
threats in law, economics, and computer science, assimilating to a larger
literature on informed trading in securities markets. From a conceptual perspective, several contributions in computer science11 have developed
frameworks for analyzing self-protection decisions among firms that are potential cybersecurity risks, arguing that firms, in a world of scarce resources,
may optimally triage their self-protection efforts based on a cost-benefit
calculus. Such calculus can often give rise to collective action problems of
either under- or over-investment in protection, when (say) interconnected
firms within a network make individual decisions about security.12 Others in
information sciences have analyzed the problem from the standpoint of timing, asking whether targets should invest proactively before an attack or reactively afterward.13 If reactive investment is possible to mitigate an existing
attack (and the information about such an attack becomes known), it may
well be optimal to under-invest in proactive technology and utilize such mitigation efforts once attacks are detected.14
Although we are unaware of significant market pricing literature on
informed cyber-trading per se, the efficiency implications of informed trading have been richly explored using seminal frameworks from information
economics, which demonstrate how informed traders can simultaneously
catalyze price discovery and impede market depth and liquidity.15 Empiri9

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018).
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2018).
11
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Gordon & Martin P. Loeb, The Economics of Information Security Investment, 5 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. & SYS. SECURITY (TISSEC) 438, 439 (Nov.
2002) (reviewing literature).
12
See Marc Lelarge, Coordination in Network Security Games: A Monotone Comparative
Statics Approach, 30 IEEE J. ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMM. 2210, 2210-2219 (Nov. 2012);
Howard Kunreuther & Geoffrey Heal, Interdependent Security, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
231, 231–49 (Mar. 2003) (making a similar point using a framework based on a terrorism
scenario); Darius N. Lakdawalla & Eric L. Talley, Optimal Liability for Terrorism 1-34 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12578, 2006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=93
5571 (applying, similarly, such arguments to terrorism scenarios, and arguing that overinvestment in strategic target hardening by potential victims may justify allowing attacked parties to
lodge a cause of action against non-attacked entities for over-protection).
13
See Rainer Böhme & Tyler Moore, The “Iterated Weakest Link” Model of Adaptive
Security Investment, 7 J. OF INFO. SECURITY 81, 86–91 (2016).
14
Id. at 91.
15
See, e.g., Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA
1315 (Nov. 1985); Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Information, Trade and Common Knowledge, 26 J. ECON. THEORY 17 (1982); Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and
Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN.
10
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cally, our analysis draws on a growing computer science literature identifying misconfiguration flags to predict vulnerability to hacking, as well as
estimating latency periods for cybersecurity vulnerability breaches (of between one and twelve months before disclosure).16 Finally, the sub-strand of
the literature closest to ours studies how stock prices react to the disclosure
of cybersecurity breaches. One notable study in this area presents a metaanalysis of thirty-seven papers containing forty-five empirical studies of the
effect of information-security breaches on public company stock prices from
2003 to 2015.17 The authors find that 75.6% of the studies measure statistically significant stock-price reactions to the disclosure of cybersecurity
breaches.18 Twenty out of twenty-five studies find negative and significant
stock-price reactions for victim firms, and none of these find significant positive reactions for victim firms.19 Several other studies have found positive
and significant stock-price reactions for information security firms, plausibly
reflecting the additional demand for their services in the wake of security
breaches.20 Consistent with our findings, at least one significant study finds
evidence of pre-announcement information leakages associated with cybersecurity vulnerabilities.21 That said, we are unaware of any prior study measuring trading patterns in the months preceding the disclosure and the central
legal implications of such patterns, as we explore here.
An important caveat to our analysis warrants attention before proceeding. Although our empirical results are strongly consistent with the type of
informed cyber-trading that occurred in the St. Jude-Muddy Waters episode,
trading activity by other market participants could produce similar results. If,
for example, employees or managers of the target firm discovered early evidence of a cybersecurity breach or a vulnerability, they might also attempt to
profit from that information prior to disclosure, and their activity would similarly be observable in our data. Although many of the policy considerations
highlighted earlier would apply to this type of trader too, existing law is
already well equipped to deal with it—since insiders at the firm typically
owe duties of “trust and confidence,” the breach of which will clearly trigECON. 71 (1985). There is also a robust literature related to options market trading in advance
of general corporate news. See, e.g., Patrick Agustin et al., How Do Informed Investors Trade
in the Options Market? (June 1, 2018), http://people.stern.nyu.edu/msubrahm/papers/Informed.
pdf.
16
See Leyla Bilge & Tudor Dumitras, Before We Knew It: An Empirical Study of ZeroDay Attacks in the Real World, ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUT. & COMMC’NS SEC. 833, 842
(2012); see also Yang Liu et al., Cloudy with a Chance of Breach: Forecasting Cyber Security
Incidents, USENIX SEC. SYMP. 1009, 1017 (2015).
17
See Georgios Spanos & Angelis Lefteris, The Impact of Information Security Events to
the Stock Market: A Systematic Literature Review, 58 COMPUT. & SEC. 216 (2016).
18
Id. at 226.
19
Id. at 227.
20
Id.
21
See Maria C. Arcuri et al., The Effect of Information Security Breaches on Stock Returns: Is the Cyber Crime a Threat to Firms?, EUR. FIN. MGMT. ASS’N. CONFERENCE (2014)
(finding that the mean cumulative abnormal return to 128 cybersecurity disclosures is -.0029 in
the (-20,20) window, but shrinks to -0.003 in the (-1,1) window).
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ger insider trading liability under current law. In many ways, in fact, it is the
curiously distinct legal treatment accorded insiders and outsiders in the context of informed cybertrading that makes the topic an interesting one to
ponder.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part two presents our core empirical
analysis of informed cyber-trading. Using a novel data set of publicly disclosed cybersecurity incidents, we demonstrate unusual activity in the put
option market in the weeks leading up to the disclosure, measured through
“open interest” and trading volume.22 Part three discusses the normative implications of our findings, arguing that—relative to garden-variety informed
trading—cyber-trading plausibly deserves greater legal scrutiny under federal securities law. Part four delves further into whether current legal institutions are equipped to take on the added threats of informed cyber-trading.
Here we argue that contemporary securities fraud and computer fraud law
appear, at least individually, unfit for the challenge, both suffering from distinct forms of under-inclusiveness. While long-term statutory reforms may
provide a durable response, in the shorter term a more expedient elixir is
likely to be maintaining the status quo, in which both doctrines play a supporting role in concert with expert regulators (such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)), who should remain involved. Part five
concludes.
I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

OF

INFORMED CYBER-TRADING

In this Part, we dispense with the long-winded lawyerly prologue,23 cutting directly to the chase to: (1) describe our approach for detecting informed trading in advance of cybersecurity breach announcements; and (2)
report on our core empirical findings.
A. Data Sources
Our analysis marshals a unique data set of announced corporate data
breaches provided by the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC). Since
2005, the ITRC has collected and published an annual list of data breaches
“confirmed by various media sources and/or notification lists from state
governmental agencies.”24 The ITRC’s data breach report includes both exposure of personally identifying information—for example, any incident “in
which an individual name plus a Social Security number, driver’s license
number, medical record or financial record (credit/debit cards included) is
potentially put at risk because of exposure”—as well as exposure of
22

See infra Part II.A (defining “open interest”).
Dispirited lawyerly types can nonetheless savor the opportunity to luxuriate in the
palaverously doctrinal denouement comprising. See infra Part IV.
24
IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, DATA BREACH REPORTS 3 (2015), https://www.id
theftcenter.org/images/breach/DataBreachReports_2015.pdf.
23
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username and passwords that are not necessarily tied to an identifiable individual.25 One example of an ITRC data breach report—for a 2015 breach of
Hyatt Hotels—is reproduced in Figure 126:

Figure 1: Specimen Identity Theft Resource Center Data Breach Report
(Hyatt Hotels 2015).
The categories of information included in the report are: (1) internal
ITRC identifier of the breach; (2) the company that was attacked; (3) the
state in which that company is located; (4) the date the breach was published; (5) the type of the breach; (6) the category of the breach; (7) whether
personal records were exposed; (8) how many records were exposed; and (9)
a textual description of the breach. In addition, the ITRC provides details on
the source of information about the breach—such as a news media report or
disclosure by (or through) a governmental agency.27
The ITRC identified 4,580 data breaches from 2010 through 2015.28
While the vast majority of these incidents involve private companies, nonprofits and governmental actors, we were able to match 145 breaches to
publicly traded companies.29 To give a sense for the nature of the information contained in the textual descriptions of these 145 events, Figure 2
presents a bi-gram word cloud, which draws the most frequent consecutive
word pairs in these descriptions with a size proportional to the term’s frequency—so, larger words appear more frequently in the textual descriptions.
As Figure 2 shows, the most popular terms in these descriptions reflect information that would typically be the subject of a data breach—including

25

Id. at 2.
Id. at 31.
27
State privacy laws often require companies to notify individuals whose personal information may have been compromised. See, e.g., Notification of Security Breach Required, N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:20 (2018). Moreover, specific federal laws sometimes require disclosure, e.g., when health concerns are implicated, Notification in the Case of Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information, 45 C.F.R. § 164.400–414 (2000), or if the breach is
sufficiently material to require disclosure by a publicly traded company under the securities
laws. Although there is no general duty to disclose all material information under the securities
laws, cybersecurity vulnerabilities may fall into one of the enumerated categories of material
event disclosure required under Form 8-K.
28
IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 24.
29
Id. For reasons detailed below, we end up using a smaller sample to ensure adequate
comparability between firms and industries.
26

R
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personal information, email addresses, credit cards, addresses, and social security numbers.

Figure 2: Bi-Gram Word Cloud for ITRC Data Breach Reports
In order to conclude that transactions involving these victims of data
breaches are not due to random chance alone, it is necessary to compare
these data breaches to some sort of baseline—a “control” group. Even if
actors did not trade on corporate data breaches—for example, if we were
simply to draw public companies and calendar dates at random—some firms
would still experience unusually large (or small) trading activity for independent reasons. It is therefore necessary to establish a baseline group to
serve as a counterfactual—a comparison set that allows us to claim that but
for the hacker-trader activities, target firms and the baseline group are similar in all other relevant ways, at least on average. If but-for causation appears
to hold, then we are justified in concluding that the observed differences are
attributable (at least in part) to hacker trading or tipping.
We examine two primary sources of data in order to measure possible
hacker trading and tipping. First, we consider approximately at-the-money
(“ATM”) equity put options written on the common stock of victim firms.
An equity put option is effectively a downside bet on a firm’s stock: it gives
its holder the right (but not the obligation) to sell the firm’s stock at a speci-
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fied price (the “strike price”) on a specific expiration date (also known as
the “maturity” date for the option). If one denotes the strike price of a put
option as the firm’s stock price on its maturity date, then the holder of a put
option who acts to maximize her payoff will receive the greater of the strike
price minus the stock price or zero at the time of expiry.30 In other words,
she receives the difference between the strike price and the stock price at
maturity if the former exceeds the latter. If the stock price at maturity is
higher than the strike price, she will rationally not exercise the put option
because that would cost her money; she is better off doing nothing.31
Put options reflect a downside bet on the firm’s stock because the value
of a put option increases as the firm’s stock price at maturity decreases. Put
simply, the lower the stock price, the more the put option is worth: put options are thus directionally negative bets on the value of the firm. Because
the directional implications of a data breach are unambiguously negative for
a targeted firm—one would be hard-pressed to find an example of a successful data breach that would lead to an increase in the stock price of the victim
firm—put options are likely to become more valuable upon revelation of a
successful data breach. Thus, market demand for put options may reflect that
hackers or their “tippees” are seeking to exploit information, known only to
them about a successful data breach. As noted above, we restrict our analysis
to put options that are close to ATM—so, they have a delta between 0.4 and
0.6.32 Within this range, the strike price is likely to be relatively close to the
current price of the firm’s stock. We do so because a put option that is out of
the money is likely to be less responsive to changes in the underlying price
of the firm’s stock.
We measure market demand for put options in two ways. The first is
open interest, which refers simply to the number of outstanding put option
contracts on the stock of a particular underlying firm. The second is volume,
which refers to the quantity of put option contracts that change hands between buyers and sellers over a particular period of time. Both measure the
extent to which traders in the market are seeking to place downside bets on
the prospects of victim firms.
In order to facilitate meaningful comparisons that are straightforward to
interpret, we aggregate our dataset to the firm-event level. That is, the unit of
analysis in our study is an average measure of trading in a given firm’s put
options over a time period relative to a data breach event. For example, we
30
For example, suppose the stock’s market price at maturity is $5 and one holds a put
option with a strike price of $8. The holder can profit from this contract by (a) buying the stock
at the market price ($5) and then exercising the option, delivering the stock to the option
counterparty (for $8) and pocketing the difference ($3).
31
The discussion in the text simplifies things a bit by presuming a “European” put option,
which is exercisable only on expiration. A similar (though slightly more complicated) analysis
would attend an “American” option, which is exercisable on any date up to (and including) the
maturity date.
32
The delta of a put option refers to the sensitivity of the put’s value to changes in the
underlying stock price.

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\9-1\HLB103.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 11

Informed Trading and Cybersecurity Breaches

5-NOV-19

9:40

11

refer below to average open interest of put options for a particular firm over
the two months prior to disclosure of the data breach. If, hypothetically,
there were two events and two firms for each event, there would be four
observations, each reflecting the average open interest for each firm in the
two months prior to each event. In the following section, we describe how
we design our empirical study to maximize the reliability of inferences as to
the link between corporate data breaches and the demand for put options.
B. Empirical Design
We wish to evaluate empirically whether there is heightened trading in
put options prior to the announcement of corporate data breaches. To do so,
we rely on the well-developed literature on causal inference in empirical
economics.33 To be sure, our hypothesis is inherently descriptive in nature—
we do not suppose that data breaches causally increase put option trading,
but rather that individuals who are aware of data breaches prior to the rest of
the market may be directly trading or tipping others as to the presence of
these vulnerabilities prior to disclosure. Formally speaking, this thesis requires only a correlation between the execution of corporate data breaches
and market demand for put options.
Nonetheless, we are aware that an analysis of this sort is vulnerable to
spurious correlations. The problem of forming a valid counterfactual—defining what level of put option trading would have emerged even in the
absence of a data breach—is a vexing challenge that applies to our study,
just as much as with a classical causal inference project. For this reason, we
employ methods to estimate the average treatment effect of data breaches,
keeping in mind the importance of forming a valid counterfactual to evaluate
whether observed put option demand can actually be attributed to data
breaches.
We thus estimate two basic kinds of empirical designs, each of which
relies on a different dataset. The first is a cross-sectional estimation, which
simply asks: is there a heightened level of open interest and trading volume
in the put options of data breach targets, prior to revelation of the data
breach by the victim firm? To minimize the likelihood that this simple comparison between firms for each event is contaminated by other events that
may give rise to put option trading, this estimation focuses on the two
months immediately preceding announcement of the data breach. In this
specification, we ask whether the average level of open interest and trading
volume during this two-month period is higher for firms that are the victims

33
See, e.g., Jonah Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, Empirical Law and Economics, 1 OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECON. (Francesco Parisi ed. 2017).
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of data breaches. As described below, we employ propensity score matching34 to ensure that treatment and control firms are as similar as possible.
This cross-sectional specification, however, is vulnerable to the critique
that firms may differ for unobserved reasons that can lead to greater overall
demand for put options. To address this concern, we consider an alternative
difference-in-differences design, which allows each firm-event in our dataset
to have a baseline level of open interest and trading volume of put options.
In this difference-in-differences specification, we compare the change in
open interest and volume of put options from a baseline period, eight to
sixteen months prior to announcement of the data breach, to the period of
interest, eight months prior to the day of announcement.
In our difference-in-differences design, we use this eight-month cutoff
for two reasons. First, this corresponds roughly to the average period of time
during which a hacker is aware of a successful data breach.35 Moreover, a
visual inspection of the data shows that this is also approximately the time
when time trends begin to diverge between treatment and control firms—
prior to this point, they are roughly parallel, as we show below.
We aggregate pre-post differences to the firm-event level and compare
these differences between treatment and control firms. As with the crosssectional design, we employ propensity score matching on observable firmlevel covariates, measured as of the year prior to the attack, to ensure that
similar firms are compared to each other. This heightens the plausibility of
the counterfactual inference that treatment and control firms would have
similar counterfactual outcomes. Along with showing that the parallel trends
assumption is satisfied, this evidence suggests that observed differences in
put option trading are likely to be linked to corporate data breaches and not
spuriously arising as a result of other differences between firms.
As noted previously, both of our specifications employ propensity score
matching,36 which matches each treatment observation to one or more control observations which are similar along several covariates. We generate a
propensity score and thus matching observations by estimating a logistic regression on the following covariates: (1) four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry code; (2) log of market capitalization; (3) log of
total assets; (4) log of net income; and (5) log of total liabilities. In our view,
it is essential to compare within industry because firms in different industries
are very different from each other. For that reason, we do not attempt to
compare trading behavior between firms in different industries

34
See generally Alberto Abadie & Guido W. Imbens, Large Sample Properties of Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effects, 74 ECONOMETRICA 235 (2006).
35
Research by Symantec has shown that hackers tend to exploit security vulnerabilities
for an average of ten months prior to discovery by the affected firm. Bilge & Dumitras, supra
note 16, at 842.
36
See Abadie & Imbens, supra note 34.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Cross-Sectional Dataset

Table 2: Summary Statistics: Difference-in-Differences Dataset

For these reasons, we are forced to drop those firms in industries which
are too small to allow for a meaningful matched control group. Indeed, while
many of these smaller industries contain several firms, many small-cap firms
are too illiquid to have frequent options trading. Limiting the sample to
those firms for which we have sufficient information over the relevant time
periods yields forty-six treatment firm-event pairs and 3,319 control firmevent pairs in the difference-in-differences dataset and fifty-one treatment
firm-event pairs and 3,425 control firm-event pairs in the difference-in-dif-
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ferences dataset.37 Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics on these
datasets.
The validity of our propensity score matching method to estimate
causal effects turns on the extent to which the treatment and control groups
are balanced—or likely to exhibit the same counterfactual outcomes even in
the absence of treatment. Of course, there are a relatively small number of
public companies with liquid options in each four-digit SIC code industry,
so any matching procedure will fall short of achieving perfect balance.
Nonetheless, we perform a series of tests to verify balance in the distribution
of treatment and control firms.
We begin by visually comparing the distribution of the propensity score
for both the cross-sectional and difference-in-differences datasets when estimated using the full set of covariates. Figure 3 shows this distribution before
and after matching for the cross-sectional and difference-in-differences
datasets, respectively.38 The similarity in the density of the two propensity
scores suggests that the two groups are balanced on the propensity score.

Figure 3: Propensity Score Balance Tests for Cross Sectional (left panel)
and Difference-in-Differences Data Sets (right panel). In both the left and
right panels, the density of propensity scores is plotted for treatment groups
(solid lines) and control groups (dashed lines), comparing the raw controls
with the propensity score matched observations.
Due to the relatively small number of public firms with liquid equity
options in each SIC code, achieving greater balance on one covariate inevitably involves a loss of balance on another (to some extent). For this reason,
we present the results using propensity score matching on individual
covariates, as well as on all of the covariates together, to illustrate that the
results do not depend on which covariates are included.39
Table 3 compares covariate means in the cross-sectional and differencein-differences dataset between the raw and matched samples. While the
37

The latter contains more firms than the former because it covers a longer time period.
In these figures, the propensity score is estimated on the subsample which contains
nonzero open interest, but the results are virtually identical when estimating on the subsample
that contains nonzero trading volume.
39
See supra Part II.B.
38
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matching is unable to achieve perfect balance across all of the covariates
simultaneously, Table 3 shows that each specification leads to near-perfect
balance on a different covariate. As shown below, the consistency of the
coefficient estimates across these different specifications in significance and
magnitude strongly suggests that the results are not driven by spurious variation in covariate balance.
Cross-Sectional Matching

Difference-in-Differences Matching

Table 3: Balance Test on Individual Covariates for Cross-Sectional (upper
panel) and Difference-in-Differences (lower panel) matched-sample
specifications. The raw mean in the largest possible subsample for each
covariate is given in the first column. While the matching is unable to
achieve perfect balance across all of the covariates simultaneously, this table
shows that each specification leads to near-perfect balance on a different
covariate.
C. Cross-Sectional Analysis
We begin by estimating the average treatment effect (“ATE”) for the
targeted firms by propensity score matching40 them with non-targeted comparators over a variety of economic indicia. Normalizing the disclosure date
to 0 for all breached firms, we compare logged open interest and logged
volume of targeted firms to their matched counterparts over the interval [60,0], corresponding to approximately the two-month period that precedes
the first disclosure of the data breach.41 Here, our identification strategy is
based on the assumption that this interval is likely to be unknown to anyone
40
41

See Abadie & Imbens, supra note 34.
We show below that the results are not driven by the choice of this interval.

R
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other than the hacker (and any tippees) and corporate officers who may have
become aware of the data breach. First, we estimate the difference in logged
open interest on outstanding put options between treatment and control firms
for a variety of matching covariates. The results are shown in Table 4:

Table 4: Cross-Sectional Estimation; Logged Open Interest
As the first row of Table 4 illustrates, there is an average increase of
between 0.36 and 0.75 log points in the open interest of the put options
written on target firms, and the result is consistent and statistically significant across specifications. To get a sense of the economic significance of the
coefficients reported above, recall from Table 1 that the mean logged open
interest was around 4.60. Thus, an open-interest coefficient estimate of 0.7
in the full model (see Column 4) corresponds to roughly 0.70/4.60 = 15% of
the mean logged open interest.
Next, we estimate differences in log trading volume of outstanding put
options between treatment and control firms. The results are shown in Table
5, which shows an average increase of between 0.53 and 1.28 log points in
trading volume of put options written on target firms. The result grows in
both magnitude and significance as additional covariates are included in the
propensity score matching, indicating that initial statistical insignificance
may represent estimation noise driven by over-weighting of firms that are
dissimilar.
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Table 5: Cross-Sectional Estimation; Log Volume
As to the economic significance of these coefficients, recall from Table
1 that the mean log volume was 1.62. Thus, the point estimate of 1.28 in the
full model corresponds to roughly 79% additional trading volume of put
options in the targets of corporate data breaches relative to the control group.
All told, in addition to their statistical significance, our cross-sectional estimates for both open interest and volume appear to represent relatively large
economic effects as well.
Although Tables 4 and 5 already provide some robustness analysis as to
our matching covariates, we also conducted a robustness check on our propensity score method. Specifically, we re-estimated the treatment effect with
all covariates across three other matching schemes for identifying treatment
effects: inverse-probability weighting,42 inverse-probability weighting with
regression adjustment,43 and regression adjustment.44 The results are shown
in the panels of Table 6, which demonstrates significant consistency across
scoring methodologies.

42
See Guido W. Imbens, The Role of the Propensity Score in Estimating Dose-Response
Functions, 87 BIOMETRIKA 706, 707–708 (2000).
43
See generally Jeffrey M. Woolridge, Inverse Probability Weighted Estimation for General Missing Data Problems, 141 J. ECONOMETRICS 1281 (2007).
44
See generally Peter W. Lane & John A. Nelder, Analysis of Covariance and Standardization as Instances of Prediction, 38 BIOMETRICS 613 (1982).
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Log Open Interest

Log Volume

Table 6: Alternative Matching Methods; Cross-Sectional Analysis; Log
Open Interest (upper panel) and Log Volume (lower panel)
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We also explored whether our results are an artifact of the two-month
interval [-60,0], re-estimating the models matching on the full set of
covariates using a variety of time event windows. The results for open interest and volume are shown in the following table.
Log Open Interest

Log Volume

Table 7: Alternative Time Horizons; Cross-Sectional Analysis; Log Open
Interest (upper panel) and Log Volume (lower panel)
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While it is clear from Table 7 that some subsamples yield higher tstatistics than others, the point estimates are consistent in sign and magnitude regardless of the time window.
D. Difference-in-Differences Analysis
A potential concern with the results in the prior section is that no matter
how careful we are in matching treatment with control firms, our treatment
firms may still differ from our controls on some important, unobserved dimension(s). To address this concern, we estimated a difference-in-differences specification, which adds to the treatment/control comparison a
comparison of each firm to its prior self. Specifically, the difference-in-differences approach estimates a baseline level of open interest and volume on
outstanding put options of target firms over the interval [-480, -240]— approximately sixteen months to eight months prior to disclosure of the data
breach in each treatment firm.45 We then compare differences between treatment and control firms during this baseline window to the analogous differences interval [-240, 0]—or approximately eight months prior to disclosure
up to the date of announcement. As explained previously, we aggregated the
change in the log average open interest and log volume of put options between the two periods by firm-event, so there is one observation per firmevent. We then employed propensity score matching with robust standard
errors to ensure that treatment and control firms are as balanced as possible
on observable covariates and proceed to estimate the ATE on this outcome—
which equals the difference in log open interest and log volume).
It is important to emphasize that our difference-in-differences approach
represents more of a robustness check of our baseline finding than it does a
strict causal inference test. That is, we do not suggest that the cybersecurity
vulnerability “causes” the informed trading we observe, but rather that they
co-occur together. To be sure, our difference-in-differences analysis is in the
spirit of a causal design, in that we inquire whether there is a parallel evolution prior to a certain point in time when the informed trading appears to
commence. That said, we expressly embrace this approach in an exploratory
fashion, so that our goal is to examine at what point informed trading appears to commence. As such, we plot trends on log open interest between the
treatment and control groups in the following figure:

45

We show below that the results are not driven by the choice of this specific interval.
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Figure 4: This figure plots time trends for log average open interest (left
panel) and trading volume (right panel) on put options between treatment
and control firms in the matched sample. The pre-treatment period (in days)
is the interval [-480, -240), and the post-treatment period is the interval [240; 0].
An eyeballing assessment of these parallel-trend figures suggests that
the two groups appear to follow somewhat parallel trends prior to divergence
during this eight-month period preceding disclosure of the data breach. We
note that the respective trends in the open interest charts does seem to exhibit some divergence in trends as the eight-month point approaches (which
may be due to the illiquid market for options with expiry longer than one
year). In any event, the open interest graph suggests an increase in the number of outstanding put options in the treatment group. Differences in volume,
on the other hand, seem driven by a decrease in the control group. (While
reiterating that we are not strictly estimating a causal relationship, we note
that the relative movement in the difference of interest in both graphs represent valid identification approaches for inferring average treatment effects in a difference-in-differences design.)
Proceeding to the statistical analysis, as before we first estimated the
difference in pre-post differences of log open interest and log volume between treatment and control firms. The results of each estimation are shown
in Table 8. As can be seen from the upper panel of the table, for open interest
we estimated an average treatment effect of between 0.26 and 0.32 log
points in the pre-post difference in open interest of put options written on
target firms, and the result is consistent and statistically significant across
nearly every specification. The only insignificant specification has the fewest covariates included, but the point estimate is similar, and thus the insignificance is likely to be driven by noise in the data. Similar results emerge
from our volume estimations (bottom panel), where we find an average positive treatment effect of between 0.23 and 0.36 log points.46 As with the
46
Compared to the summary statistics in Table 2, the economic significance of the estimated coefficients is somewhat smaller than in the cross-sectional analysis, but it is still appreciable. See supra Table 2.
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cross-sectional estimation, the result is significant and increases in magnitude as additional covariates are included in the propensity score matching,
indicating that initial statistical insignificance may simply reflect estimation
noise driven by over-weighting of firms that are more different from each
other.
As with our cross-sectional estimations, we test how sensitive these results are to the propensity score matching method. Specifically, we re-estimate the average treatment effects from Table 8 with all covariates, again
using three distinct alternative methods for matching. These sensitivity tests
are illustrated in Table 9 below. As before, we continue to find that our
results are largely robust, remaining positive and significant for nearly every
matching method, and similar in magnitude to the propensity score
estimation.
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Log Open Interest

Log Volume

Table 8: Difference-in-Differences Estimation; Log Open Interest (upper
panel); Log Volume (lower panel)
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Log Open Interest

Log Volume

Table 9: Alternative Matching Techniques; Difference-in-Differences; Log
Open Interest (upper panel) and Log Volume (lower panel)
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Finally, as above, we consider whether the results are robust to our
choice of the interval in the difference-in-differences approach, altering the
pre- and post-treatment specifications. The re-estimated results using a variety of different time horizons for open interest and volume are shown in the
following table:
Log Open Interest

Log Volume

Table 10: Alternative Time Horizons; Difference-in-Differences Analysis;
Log Open Interest (upper panel) and Log Volume (lower panel)
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While some subsamples yield higher t-statistics than others, all point
estimates are consistent in sign and magnitude regardless of the time
window.
All told, our empirical analysis uncovers relatively pronounced evidence of market trading abnormalities in the options market prior to the public disclosure of a cybersecurity threat. While the magnitude of the effect
varies (as it invariably does) on the precise estimation methodology, our
results appear to be robust across the conventional alternative candidates.
Although we are tempted at this stage simply to call it a day—relegating the
practical details of policy responses to some unnamed future commentator—
our professional duty (or our authorial zeal) impels us further to ask: (1)
whether the findings above pose a normative problem that securities law
should address; and (2) if so, whether the tools already exist and/or are being
developed for the task at hand. It is to these questions we now turn.
II. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS: IS CYBER-TRADING SPECIAL?
Having offered empirical evidence that informed cyber-trading appears
to occur in practice, we now turn to the “so what?” question: does informed
trading in advance of a cybersecurity breach disclosure raise important and
idiosyncratic policy concerns for the efficient operation of capital markets?
If it does, then there would be a prima facie efficiency case for tailoring
legal rules in order to account for cyber-trading concerns. If, in contrast, the
concerns raised by informed cyber-trading are largely identical to those of
garden-variety information-trading contexts, then there would be no particular reason to treat the activity with any special degree of legal or regulatory
skepticism.
In the familiar policy debate surrounding informed securities market
trading—as well as how and whether it should be regulated legally—scholars have advanced at least four policy dimensions worthy of attention47: (1)
price discovery; (2) distributional fairness; (3) market liquidity; and (4) allocative efficiency. We discuss each in turn below in the context of cybersecurity-related trading. Our analysis suggests that while informed cybertrading does not seem particularly special when viewed against any of the
first three dimensions on this list, it raises potentially unique efficiency concerns as to the fourth, plausibly justifying sui-generis regulatory scrutiny.

47
See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY
21–47 (1991). Another relevant policy dimension concerns strategic incentives of corporate
insiders themselves (such as whether to delay disclosure of information in order to permit
informed trading). Id. at 37. We exclude these considerations here, since the predominant set
of issues concerns non-statutory insiders.
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A. Price Discovery
Consider first the desideratum of pricing efficiency—for example, the
proposition that capital markets should be structured to facilitate the systematic adjustment of prices to incorporate relevant information about the “fundamentals” underlying traded securities. When satisfied (at least roughly),
pricing efficiency assists market participants in making sound portfolio
choices, and it helps firms to finance value-enhancing projects. Indeed, as
has long been known (and celebrated) by economists, market prices are
often an excellent mechanism to summarize and convey information about
the underlying economic attributes of an asset (for example, its scarcity and
riskiness), a benefit that frees most market participants from the costly task
of having to investigate and verify such matters directly.48 A closely related
corollary to pricing efficiency follows immediately: that it is preferable for
securities prices to adjust rapidly as market and company fundamentals
change, rather than on a delayed or attenuated basis (where pricing inaccuracies persist). Such rapid price “discovery” ensures that relevant information
about market fundamentals flows to individuals as quickly as possible, further enabling them to make sound portfolio choices.
To the extent one views price discovery as important (and most economists do), it typically counsels a permissive stance on informed trading. Although most securities market prices are thought to rapidly reflect relevant
publicly available information (sometimes called “semi-strong” efficient),
informed trading can sharpen that accuracy by hastening the incorporation of
new information into market price. If informed traders are permitted to trade
freely on the basis of their information, their own trading activity will systematically drive up (or down) the price of a financial asset whenever it is
under- or over-priced based on the newly-arrived information.49 Indeed, not
only will the prospect of arbitraging the information be attractive to such
traders, but it will also motivate at least some of them to monitor new information in the first place. The ensuing price change effectively transmits the
import of that new information to other market participants, providing a public good that enhances overall pricing efficiency.
Informed cyber-trading shares many of these traits. Given a known vulnerability that will soon be disclosed, informed trading can push market
prices in the direction of fundamentals. Moreover, one might argue, the ability to profit from that information helps induce aspiring arbitrageurs to discover information about such future disclosures. Thus, in our view, the
48
See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519,
526–528 (1945). It is worth noting, of course, that when the set of underlying economic attributes at stake is sufficiently varied and rich, price—a unidimensional piece of information—
may become a less reliable embodiment of such attributes. See, e.g., Archishman Chakraborty
& Bilge Yılmaz, Manipulation in Market Order Models, 7 J. FIN. MKT.187–206 (2004).
49
See generally Henry Manne, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Macey, supra note 47.
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relative merits of informed trading for price discovery remain relatively consistent (at least on first approximation) when one compares informed cybertrading to garden variety information trading. There does not seem to be
much of a compelling argument—at least on the basis of this desideratum—
that counsels for more rigorous relative scrutiny.
B. Distributional Fairness
The desideratum of pricing efficiency just discussed consciously accepts the reality that the price discovery process will—by definition—produce (informed) winners and (uninformed) losers in individual trades, and
that their interactions through the market will provide a public good of price
discovery. From a pure Kaldor-Hicks efficiency perspective, this outcome
seems eminently defensible, since winners and losers in the trading market
are largely engaged in making or receiving transfer payments from one another—activities that play a neutral role in the efficiency calculus. At the
same time, to the extent that one’s measure of economic welfare also places
weight on distributional equity,50 the transfer payments that facilitate price
discovery may matter too—particularly if the identities of the winners and
losers in this process are highly correlated across trades and over time, permitting certain traders to make systematic arbitrage rents at the expense of
others. To the extent that winning and losing is systematic in information
trading, the prospect of a consistently unlevel playing field in securities markets might well be a significant welfare cost of price discovery—one that
attenuates the case for pursuing perfect (or near perfect) pricing efficiency.51
Although economic-minded commentators vary in the extent to which
they value distributive equity concerns in the context of informed trading,52
resolving this longstanding disagreement proves unnecessary here: for distributive fairness concerns—while plausibly relevant—shed little additional
light on the problem in the context of informed cyber-trading. To be sure,
given the scarcity of programming and hacking talent and access to large
50
See generally Hal R. Varian, Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics, and a Theory of
Fairness, 4 PHIL. PHILOSOPHY AND PUB. AFF. 223 (1975) (advancing such a theory).
51
It should be noted that the “level playing field” rationale for securities law—a rough
proxy for distributive fairness—has largely been rejected as a formal statutory goal by courts.
See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (rejecting the “level playing
field” desideratum advanced by the SEC). Remaining mindful of the difference between “is”
and “ought,” however, it is worthwhile to ponder fairness anyway, since it remains a relevant
normative criterion.
52
See generally Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and the
Efficiency of Stock Prices, 23 RAND J. ECON. 106 (1992); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness,
Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age,
94 NW. U. L. REV. 443 (2001). There is also a longstanding debate about whether distributional fairness concerns—even if relevant from a welfare perspective—should enter into liability standards at all, or rather should be capitalized into tax-and-transfer systems. See generally
LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). This argument is
particularly unhelpful here, however, since securities markets are global and many participants
are beyond the taxing authority of any single governmental actor.
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trading platforms, it is plausible that informed cyber-traders may enjoy systematic rents across firms, across transactions, and over time. It is also plausible that their informed trades bring information of tremendous value to the
market through the pricing mechanism, tipping off not only uninformed traders but also the firms themselves about the risk of a hack. That said, a similar
(if not identical) set of tradeoffs appears manifest in virtually any informed
trading context. Consequently, there does not appear to be a compelling reason to accord greater (or lesser) scrutiny to informed cyber-trading than any
other type of informed trading activity.
C. Market Liquidity
A third consideration that often attends the insider trading debate—and
one that combines the two aforementioned concerns—concerns market liquidity. To the extent that informed parties are allowed to participate in market trading, they will typically transact their business alongside uninformed
market participants, who may become wary of being taken advantage of
when they trade with informed parties. In such settings, uninformed market
participants can understandably become reluctant to provide liquidity to the
market. Indeed, the very fact that a (possibly) informed trader wishes to buy
or sell a financial asset may constitute a strong signal that one stands to lose
by serving as counterparty to the proposed transaction. In fact, in the extreme case where the predominant driver of trade is private information,
trading among uninformed counterparties can shut down completely, leading
to the near collapse of a market53—a consequence that is, ironically enough,
deeply antithetical to price discovery. Informed traders, therefore, play simultaneously heroic and parasitic roles in their relationship with other traders. They heroically contribute to price discovery, but they parasitically
require liquidity-trader participation in order to make information arbitrage
profitable, even though their very presence can systematically deter such
participation.54 Consequently, even when pricing efficiency is of vital importance and distributive equity concerns are assumed away, it may be efficiency-enhancing for market regulators to embrace a compromise where
information trading is permitted, yet limited in magnitude to a level that
does not engender market dysfunction or illiquidity.55
As above, however, the importance of depth and liquidity to capital
markets in the context of informed cyber-trading does not seem systematically distinct from its importance in the general context of informed trading.
In both cases, the extreme prevalence of private information can cause markets to seize up, thereby justifying (at least potentially) some outer limits on

53

See Milgrom & Stokey, supra note 15, at 17.
See Kyle, supra note 15, at 1315–17.
See Hans R. Stoll, Inferring the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: Theory and Empirical Tests, 44 J. FIN. 115 (1989); Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 15, at 72.
54

R
R
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ability of participants to exploit information advantages. Though the precise
boundary that such limits should demark is far from clear, there is also little
reason to think that its location is dramatically different in the context of
informed cyber-trading.
D. Allocative Efficiency
Finally, informed trading in securities markets can foment a host of
different issues related to allocative efficiency, in which market participants
may incur costly expenditures in order to facilitate and/or prevent the transfer payments that attend information arbitrage. Aspiring informed traders,
for example, may overinvest in acquiring inside information about existing
(but as-yet-undisclosed) risks, or in keeping such information proprietary,
hoping to exploit it maximally for personal advantage. Potential market
counterparties, in turn, may respond by overinvesting themselves, suspicious
that their counterparties are informed traders attempting to exploit their ignorance. Issuers, too, might get into the mix, attempting to make their cyberdefenses effectively “bullet proof” so as to avoid the costs and embarrassment of having third parties expose latent problems or risks. Even in the
presence of such costly distortions, prices could still be exceedingly accurate, reflecting (and quickly adjusting) to each new change in information.
But such pricing efficiency provides little if anything in the way of public
goods, since many market participants have little left to learn, having already
incurred substantial, duplicative costs to acquire that information directly.56
As with the analysis above, informed cyber-trading shares several of
the same allocative efficiency concerns as those that apply to the more general information-trading scenario. Traders and firms may have similar sorts
of incentives to invest “too much” (from a social perspective) in divining
latent facts. We submit, however, that at least two additional considerations
make informed cyber-trading different—and in many respects more worrisome—than the general case:
• First, unlike the garden-variety case of informed trading—
where the underlying new information is independent of the
arbitrageur’s efforts to discover it—with informed cyber-trading
the new information is substantially “created” by the hacker
and then visited on the firm. Where the hacker actively steals
proprietary data (such as employee social security numbers),
this endogeneity is obvious. But even when the hacker merely
exposes an existing vulnerability, the hacker’s actions are still
akin to imposing a harm on the target. For example, the underlying vulnerability exposed might have gone undetected for the

56
See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 U. VA. L. REV. 1230 (2001), 1230-1270.
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foreseeable future, had it not been for the prospect of extracting
cyber-trading rents. Moreover, an exposed cybersecurity vulnerability can easily compound, furnishing a digital roadmap for
countless nefarious—albeit less skilled—actors seeking to exploit the target’s likely vulnerabilities.57 (Even if the target is
able to conjure up a quick fix for the specific hack disclosed, its
software vulnerability may be far more systematic, and in any
event the exposed firm often becomes target practice for other
hackers in the wake of the initial disclosure, driving the cybertrader’s profits higher still.) In many respects, then, the cyberhacker plays a role in creating and imposing a unique harm on
the targeted company—one that (in our view) is qualitatively
different from “exogenous” information shocks serendipitously
observed by an information trader. Allowing a coordinated
hacker-trader team to capture these arbitrage gains would implicitly subsidize the very harm-creating activity that is being
“discovered” in the first instance.
• Second, and relatedly, when hackers have an enhanced incentive to create such harms, targets also have an enhanced incentive to undertake costly precautionary measures meant to deter
(or divert) hacker activity. In many situations, such undertakings can be considerable, such as investing in added internal
cyber-hacking squads, or offering attractive third-party “bounties” to those who detect and bring forward unknown vulnerabilities. These incentives are perhaps maximal in instances
where a target’s risk of hacking increases when it is identified as
the “weakest link” among potential targets. In such settings, a
type of “arms race” to self-protect can ensue among potential
targets, whereby each effectively doubles down on the equilibrium influence costs borne by hackers and targets alike.58
Informed cyber-trading, therefore, raises unique allocative efficiency
considerations relative to garden-variety information trading. Policy-minded
legal actors and commentators might thus do well at least to consider
whether—in the light of these sui-generis costs—informed cyber-trading
warrants heightened scrutiny by courts. In the next Part, we consider
whether legal institutions under the status quo are up to the task.
57
Muddy Waters’ research report on St. Jude, for example, contained a detailed 34-page
description of how to exploit two different vulnerabilities in the St. Jude pacemakers, including
step-by-step instructions detailing even what type of equipment to purchase on internet shopping sites (such as e-Bay) to consummate the hack. MUDDY WATERS CAPITAL LLC, RESEARCH REPORT ON ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC. 2-9 (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.muddywatersre
search.com/content/uploads/2016/08/MW_STJ_08252016_2.pdf.
58
We consider these incentives in detail in a technical companion piece. See Joshua Mitts
& Eric Talley, Informed Trading and Cybersecurity Breaches: Technical Companion 12–13
(unpublished manuscript 2017) (available from authors upon request).
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III. PRESCRIPTIVE CHALLENGES
The previous sections have (1) presented empirical evidence that informed cyber-trading occurs at a statistically and economically significant
scale, and (2) argued that such trading raises certain idiosyncratic policy
concerns that are not generically present in the canonical case of informed
trading. In light of these observations, we now turn to the prescriptive question of how legal institutions might address informed cyber-trading in circumstances where policy concerns justify special scrutiny. More concretely,
our approach here is to inform the pragmatic discussion as to (1) whether
current law already acts to deter informed cyber-trading trading, and (2) if
not, how one might adapt current legal institutions to address more effectively informed cyber-trading activity. We will advance the thesis that under
current federal law—outside of certain special contexts—informed cybertrading faces surprisingly little legal scrutiny. Moreover, the two most promising ways to adapt current law to address informed cyber-trading—extending insider-trading liability to outsiders or expanding the reach of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)—both fall short (in different ways)
in addressing the distinct normative quandaries raised by the practice.59
To frame and situate our prescriptive discussion, consider Table 11 below, which subdivides the legal policy question by positing the possibility
that the hacker and the trader may be different persons with different individual interests.

Table 11: Representation of Hacker’s and Trader’s Interaction

59
This discussion seems particularly timely in the light of the recent high-profile cybersecurity breaches, including the attack on the SEC’s EDGAR website, a database of draft
corporate filings – a natural goldmine for hackers seeking material nonpublic information
(“MNPI”) prior to public disclosure. Hannah Kuchler, Hackers Target Weakest Links for Insider Trading Gain, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/13a317ce-a56111e7-9e4f-7f5e6a7c98a2; Alexandra Stevenson & Carlos Tejada, S.E.C. Says It Was a Victim
of Computer Hacking Last Year, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
09/20/business/sec-hacking-attack.html.
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The columns of the table posit that the objectives of the “hacker” (a
term we use broadly, to include both “white hat” and “black hat” hackers)
can be motivated either by a desire: (1) to exploit the target’s vulnerabilities
in order to steal data; or (2) merely to detect and publicize such the target’s
vulnerabilities. The rows, in contrast, denote the trader’s interaction with the
hacker, distinguishing contexts where the trading entity : (1) is independent
from the hacker (that is, it learns of the hack through independent means); or
(2) directs, coordinates or transacts with the hacker in pursuit of a common
aim.60 While intermediate interests and degrees of coordination are no doubt
possible, Table 11 is adequate as a first approximation for our analytic task.
Each resulting permutation from this two-by-two matrix (denoted Scenario I through Scenario IV) entails slightly different normative and doctrinal considerations, thereby warranting slightly different analysis. Scenario I,
wherein the trader works actively with the hacker to steal confidential data,
corresponds to the strongest normative policy concerns, since the breach involves the loss of confidential information and the coordinated efforts of the
trader and hacker (which can in turn facilitate explicit or implicit incentive
structures that exacerbate ex ante hacking/protection incentives). Scenario II,
while stopping short of outright data theft, also tends to entail many of the
policy concerns of Scenario I, since the exposure of vulnerabilities can (as
noted above) impose “harms” on the target that are effectively subsidized
through informed trading activities. The remaining cells correspond to situations where the trader independently learns of a hacker’s outright theft (Scenario III) or mere detection of vulnerabilities (Scenario IV), but does not
coordinate efforts with the hacker. As suggested above, these latter scenarios
present weaker cases for placing liability on the trader, since (1) trading
incentives are (by hypothesis) divorced from hacking incentives (and thus
cannot subsidize the hacker’s efforts), and (2) the trader’s activity might even
expose (via the price) the existence of the hack to the public and the target.61
As a rough approximation, then, an efficiency-minded legal decision-maker
would tend to place the greatest amount of scrutiny on the upper row of the
table (Scenarios I and II). As we show below, however, current law does not
appear to have the same reach. Even the “easiest” case for scrutiny—Scenario I—sometimes can prove to be a stretch in establishing liability (particularly for traders), with perhaps the most leverage coming through criminal
sanctions; the levers for civil liability (brought either by government regulators or private parties) appear even more limited and untested under current

60
In cases where the hacker and trader are the same person, of course, the degree of
coordination between the two is complete, so that such situations would fit easily into the top
row of Table 11.
61
This is not to say that one would have no concerns in these permutations. For example,
one could argue that when an unaffiliated trader learns of an active theft of data (Scenario III),
the trader should be under a “Good Samaritan”–like duty to disclose the information. That
said, such considerations do not appear to raise sui-generis normative concerns in the case of
data breach when compared to other possible latent harms discovered by a trader.

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\9-1\HLB103.txt

34

unknown

Seq: 34

Harvard Business Law Review

5-NOV-19

9:40

[Vol. 9

law. Scenario II imposes even fewer constraints still. And, while current law
could be adapted to be a better prescriptive “fit” for either scenario, doing
so would require either structural statutory reform, or that courts be receptive to novel (and largely untested) innovations.
To help illustrate our claims, consider the seemingly “easy” case of
Scenario I, where a trader explicitly coordinates with or directs a hacker to
purloin confidential data from a target company. As noted above, this permutation presents the strongest policy case for legal or regulatory scrutiny.
And, as it happens, this particular scenario has garnered disproportionate
attention to date from courts and regulators. Here, it appears that courts have
been open to applying both federal securities and data breach statutes to
impose legal exposure on both hackers and traders.62 Interestingly, however,
the doctrinal divinations needed to impose liability risk on such actors—
while admirably creative—are still an awkward fit with the type of legal
oversight one might design from a blank slate to deal with informed cybertrading.
Analysis of these considerations need not be confined to abstract hypotheticals, however. The legal dimensions of Scenario I are evolving even
as of this writing—in the form of governmental complaints in an interrelated
cluster of high-profile actions (the “Dubovoy case”).63 These actions constitute, in many ways, a virtually perfect case study of Scenario I. In its civil
complaints filed in 2015 and 2016, the SEC charged more than forty defendants with securities fraud and related charges stemming from an alleged international hacking-and-trading scheme organized by Ukrainian nationals
Ivan Turchynov and Aleksandr Ieremenko (the “Dubovoy Hackers”).64 The
U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the District of New Jersey and the Eastern District of New York followed with criminal actions against a subset of the
named defendants in the SEC case, including the Dubovoy hackers and traders (including hedge fund managers and their investment firms)65 located

62
See Andrew N. Vollmer, Computer Hacking and Securities Fraud (Va. Law & Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 26, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2679092.
63
Complaint at ¶ 1, SEC v. Dubovoy, No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH (D.N.J. Oct. 16,
2015); Indictment at ¶ 1, United States v. Turchynov, No. 2:15-cr-00390 (D.N.J., filed Aug. 6,
2015); Indictment at ¶ 1, United States v. Korchevsky, No. 1:15-cr-00381 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 5,
2015). A subsequent complaint named additional defendants. See Complaint at ¶ 1, SEC v.
Zavodchiko, 2016 WL 9224898 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2016).
64
Indictment at ¶ 1, Turchynov, No. 2:15-cr-00390; see Jonathan Stempel, SEC Brings
New Charges Over Global Press Release Hacking Scheme, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2016), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-trading-cyber-sec/sec-brings-new-charges-over-global-press-release-hacking-scheme-idUSKCN0VR25N.
65
Cory Bennett, Hackers Cash in with Insider Trading, THE HILL (Aug. 16, 2015, 9:00
AM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/251174-hackers-cash-in-with-insider-trading;
Nate Raymond, Russia Investor, Funds Pay $18 Million to Settle U.S. Press Release Hacking
Case, Reuters (Mar. 25, 2016, 12:45 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insidertradingcyber-sec/russia-investor-funds-pay-18-million-to-settle-u-s-press-release-hacking-case-idUS
KCN0WR1A4.
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both in the U.S. and abroad (“Dubovoy Traders”).66
According to government documents, the Dubovoy Hackers repeatedly
“used deceptive means”67 over a five-year period to breach computer networks at several U.S. business newswire services—such as Marketwired, PR
Newswire, and Business Wire68—extracting material non-public information
(MNPI) in the form of “confidential earnings information for numerous publicly traded companies from press releases that had not yet been released to
the public.” The Dubovoy Hackers then sold the purloined data to the
Dubovoy Traders69 as part of an orchestrated and coordinated plan. Indeed,
the government asserts that the Dubuvoy Traders even provided the Dubovoy
Hackers with “shopping lists” of desired press releases, accessed the stolen
MNPI through secured overseas computer servers,70 and then “used that stolen [MNPI] to trade securities and reap over $100 million in unlawful profits.”71 The Dubovoy Traders are further alleged to have used “deceptive
means,” including the use of multiple fictitious accounts and entities, to conceal their trading activities.72
In its criminal indictment of the Dubovoy Traders, the government alleged a series of transgressions under federal criminal law, including:
• Securities Fraud under Rule 10b-5, in violation of 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78j(b) (Manipulative and Deceptive Devices) and 78ff (Penalties), 17 CFR 240.10b-5 (Employment of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices), and 18 U.S.C. §2 (Principals).
• Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1830 (also known as the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, or “CFAA,” discussed below).
• Wire Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349 (Attempt and Conspiracy).
• Money Laundering Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(h) (Laundering of Monetary Instruments).73

66
Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges 32 Defendants in Scheme to Trade on Hacked News
Releases (Aug. 11, 2015), Release 2015-163.
67
Complaint at ¶ 71, Dubovoy, No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH.
68
Indictment at ¶ 14, Turchynov, No. 15-cr-00390.
69
Complaint at ¶¶ 1–3, Dubovoy, No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH.
70
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hacker Sentenced To 30 Months In Prison For Role
In Largest Known Computer Hacking and Securities Fraud Scheme (May 22, 2017).
71
Complaint at ¶ 1, Dubovoy, No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH.
72
Id. at ¶ 7.
73
Indictment at ¶¶ 112–45, U.S. v. Turchynov, No. 15-cr-00390 (D.N.J., filed Aug. 6,
2015). In addition to the offenses listed in association with the Dubovoy Traders, it may be of
interest that the Dubovoy Hackers were also charged with crimes such as conspiracy to commit
fraud and related activity in connection with computers, fraud and related activity in connection with computers, and aggravated identity theft. The Eastern District of New York charged
the defendants with an overlapping set of crimes: Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud, Conspiracy to Commit Securities Fraud, Securities Fraud, and Money Laundering Conspiracy. Indictment at ¶¶ 45–55, U.S. v. Korchevsky, No. 15-cr-00381 (E.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 5, 2015).
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The securities fraud and CFAA charges play prominent roles here, since
(1) they embody the most general-purpose charges in the informed cybertrading context; and (2) they constitute critical predicate offenses for criminal liability under wire fraud and money-laundering statutes. The majority of
individuals indicted by the DOJ reached plea agreements with federal prosecutors between December 2015 and August 2016, pleading guilty to the wire
fraud conspiracy counts, with the DOJ dropping most of the predicate criminal charges.74 Such criminal settlements are not uncommon, and in a sense
deter others who would attempt similar conduct in the future. Yet, the
Dubuvoy plea agreements also leave open whether the predicate securities
fraud or CFAA charges themselves would have had traction had they been
pursued to trial.75 We thus consider each below in turn.
A. Securities Fraud Liability
Consider first the allegations of securities fraud. In pursuing its criminal
claims, the government had the benefit of additional enforcement expertise;
as frequently happens in securities fraud contexts,76 the SEC coordinated
with federal prosecutors and also filed a series of independent civil claims
alleging securities fraud by the Dubuvoy Traders. These allegations included:
• Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 (“‘34 Act”) and
Rule 10b-5 thereunder.77
• Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“‘33 Act”).78
74

See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 70.
It bears noting that the defendants were also charged with identity theft under federal
law, which might also have carried weight as a predicate offense for wire fraud/money
laundering.
76
See Mary Jo White, SEC Chair, All-Encompassing Enforcement: The Robust Use of
Civil and Criminal Actions to Police the Markets (March 31, 2014).
77
Complaint at ¶¶ 225–27, SEC v. Dubovoy, No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH (D.N.J.,
filed August 10, 2015) (“By engaging in the conduct described above, defendants knowingly
or recklessly, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, directly or indirectly, by use
the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or the mails, or the facilities of a national securities exchange:(a) employed devices, schemes or artifices to defraud; (b) made
untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or (c) engaged in acts, practices, or courses of business which operated or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. . . . By engaging in the foregoing conduct defendants violated, and unless enjoined
will continue to violate, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.”).
78
Id. at ¶¶ 222–24. (“Defendants, by engaging in the conduct described above, knowingly
or recklessly, in connection with the offer or sale of securities, by the use of the means or
instruments of transportation, or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails,
directly or indirectly: (a) employed devices, schemes or artifices to defraud; (b) obtained
money or property by means of untrue statements of material facts, or omissions to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading; and/or (c) engaged in transactions, practices or courses
of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. . .By
engaging in the foregoing conduct, defendants violated, and unless enjoined will continue to
violate, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act.”).
75

R
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• Sections 20(b)79 and (e)80 of the ’34 Act.
As with the criminal case, Rule 10b-5 plays a starring—and, indeed, central—role here, as several of the other charges effectively bootstrap to the
10b-5 allegations. Note, however, that CFAA claims are wholly absent in the
SEC’s complaint (since CFAA enforcement is not part of the Commission’s
regulatory mandate).
Several of the SEC’s parallel cases remain pending as of this writing,
and it appears that most have been stayed pending the resolution of remaining criminal actions.81 That said, at least two opinions have already emanated
from the civil actions, and both are relevant to our inquiry here. First, shortly
after the SEC complaint was filed, the District Court in New Jersey entered a
temporary restraining order freezing the defendants’ assets and an order to
show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be entered against all
defendants.82 A “subset” of the Dubovoy Traders (the “Amaryan Defendants”) appealed this order.83 On October 16, 2015, the court issued an opinion (the “Amaryan Opinion”) granting the SEC’s motion for a preliminary
injunction because it had “raise[d] a strong inference that the Amaryan Defendants violated federal securities laws . . . .”84 On February 12, 2016,
hedge fund Memelland Investments Ltd. (“Memelland”), one of the
Dubovoy Traders, filed a motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6).85 On September 29, 2016, the court issued a second opinion (the “Memelland Opinion”) denying Memelland’s motion because “the SEC particularly pled its
fraud and aiding and abetting claims,” giving rise to a strong inference that
79
Section 20(b) of the ’34 Act “broadly prohibits violating federal securities law through
the means of another person.” William D. Roth, The Role of Section 20(b) in Securities Litigation, 6 HARVARD BUS. LAW REV. 36, 36 (2015), http://www.hblr.org/2015/12/the-role-of-section-20b-in-securities-litigation/; see Complaint at ¶ 233–34, Dubovoy, No. 2:15-cv-06076MCA-MAH (“ By engaging in the foregoing conduct, the trader defendants violated Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rule 10b-5 [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5],
thereunder through or by means of the hacker defendants. 234. By engaging in the foregoing
conduct, pursuant to Section 20(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78t(b)], defendants,
except Ieremenko and Turchynov, violated, an[d] unless enjoined will continue to violate
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rule 110b-5 [17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5], thereunder.”).
80
Complaint at ¶¶ 230–31, Dubovoy, No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH (“Through their
illicit trading, payments to the hacker defendants, instruction about which releases to obtain,
and other means alleged in this Complaint, the trader defendants knowingly provided substantial assistance to, and thereby aided and abetted, the hacker defendants in connection with the
hacker defendants’ violations of the securities laws. By engaging in the foregoing conduct,
pursuant to Section 15(b) of the Securities Act and Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, defendants, except Ieremenko and Turchynov, violated, an unless enjoined will continue to violate
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)] and Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rule 10b-5 [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5], thereunder.”)
81
John Reed Stark, Think the SEC EDGAR Data Breach Involved Insider Trading? Think
Again., D&O DIARY (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/10/articles/cyber-liability/guest-post-think-sec-edgar-data-breach-involved-insider-trading-think/.
82
SEC v. Dubovoy, No. 15-6076, 2016 WL 5745099, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2016).
83
Id. at *1.
84
SEC v. Dubovoy, No. 15-6076, 2015 WL 6122261, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2015).
85
Dubovoy, 2016 WL 5745099, at *1.
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Memelland acted with scienter to “deceive, manipulate or defraud.”86 As of
February 2018, the Amaryan and Memelland Opinions appear to be the only
two opinions released in this matter, though the SEC has reached settlements
with several of the Dubovoy Traders.87
But what about the underlying merit of the securities fraud allegation
(whether criminal or civil)? Here, things become surprisingly opaque. The
familiar 10b-5 claim for securities fraud charges turns on showing—in connection with the purchase or sale of any security—the use of a device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud; an act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit; or, the making of any untrue
statement (and in certain cases, omission) of a material fact.88 As noted
above, Rule 10b-5 is extremely general, covering both conventional fraud
and insider trading claims. Both are at least theoretically in play in the case
of informed cyber-trading. At the same time, both prove to be awkward fits
in many plausible factual scenarios.
The offense of “insider trading” is not explicitly codified in Rule 10b5, but it instead emerged as a judicial construction of Rule 10b-5 that effectively equates an informed trader’s silence (in appropriate circumstances)
with an affirmative misstatement of material fact. In this respect, the doctrine is a bit of a catch-all, broadening the application of Rule 10b-5 beyond
a strict construction of its text.89 Nevertheless, even when read in this broad
fashion, insider trading has time-honored boundaries that make it a difficult
fit, even in Scenario I.
86

Id. at *1.
See Trader Agrees to Settle Claims Relating to Hacked News Release Scheme; SEC’s
Recovery to Date in Connection with the Scheme Exceeds $52 Million, Release No. LR23530, 2016 WL 2615155 (May 4, 2016) (“Without admitting or denying the allegations in
the SEC’s complaint, Makarov agreed to be permanently enjoined from violating Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder and Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933 and pay disgorgement of $100,000.”).
88
The specific text of Rule 10b-5 reads as follows:
87

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
89
Stark, supra note 81. This judicial construction has a long pedigree: the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Superintendent v. Bankers Life that the antifraud provisions should be applied
broadly, such that “Rule 10b-5 prohibit[s] all fraudulent schemes in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of
fraud, or present a unique form of deception.” Superintendent of Ins. of State of N. Y. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11 n.7 (1971); see also Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves,
67 MD. L. REV. 570, 574 (2008).
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There are two predominant pathways to prove insider trading under
Rule 10b-5, frequently referred to as the “classical” and “misappropriation”
theories. The classical theory—often dubbed the “traditional” theory as it
was developed first—teaches that “a corporate insider”90 (with a fiduciary
duty to the corporation’s shareholders) may not trade in the securities of his
or her corporation on the basis of material information not generally known
to the investing public, and which, if made public, would substantially affect
the judgment of a reasonable investor.”91 The classical theory was easily
expanded to cover “tippee” outsiders who receive MNPI from “tipper” insiders (who themselves receive a personal benefit from tipping) and trade
with knowledge (actual or reasonable) that the insider(s) breached their duties by tipping for personal benefit.92
Misappropriation theory—developed later—further expanded insider
trading liability such that “a person violates Rule 10b-5 when he misappropriates confidential information for the purpose of securities trading, in
breach of a duty owed to the source of the information, rather than to the
shareholders of the [issuing] corporation.”93 The misappropriation theory
thus reached certain types of corporate outsiders who nonetheless “deal in
deception” against a third-party owner of information by “pretend[ing] loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal’s information for
personal gain.”94
Under either the classical or misappropriation theories, then, the insider-trading prohibition has come to be understood to mean that “individuals may not purchase or sell securities based on knowledge of nonpublic
information that they legally obtained or possessed as a consequence of
their employment or similar circumstances.” 95 That is, the linchpin for deducing whether actionable insider trading has occurred under Rule 10b-5 is
by “equating a breach of fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty [toward the information’s rightful owner] with the fraud requirement.”96
And therein lies the rub. As capacious as insider trading theories have
become, the accepted doctrinal framework squares poorly with the canonical
case of informed cyber-trading (as well as the facts of Dubuvoy), where the
90
These include statutory insiders under Section 16A, as well as certain “constructive”
insiders who are in a relationship of trust and confidence with the issuer. See Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646, 661 n.20 (1983).
91
Hagar Cohen, Cracking Hacking: Expanding Insider Trading Liability in the Digital
Age, 17 SW. J. INT’L L. 259, 265 (2011); see generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980).
92
Cohen, supra note 91, at 266–67; see, e.g., Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659; Salman v. United
States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423 (2016). Even after Salman, it remains somewhat unclear what
knowledge the trading tippee(s) must have about the original tipper’s motives. Salman, 137 S.
Ct. at 427.
93
Cohen, supra note 91, at 267; see generally United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997).
94
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 (1997).
95
Steinbuch, supra note 89, at 575 (emphasis added).
96
Id. at 575–76.
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hacker and trader are neither fiduciaries of the target, nor are they in a relationship of trust and confidence with a third party information “owner.”97
Indeed, it is hard to see how Scenario I would trigger any liability under the
received insider trading framework, since no fiduciary relationship is
breached when a hacker targets an unrelated company’s MNPI, and then
passes such information in a coordinated fashion to a trader. Simply (if ironically) put, “mere thieves” of MNPI—even those who profit from it through
market transactions—are not insiders according to Rule 10b-5.98
That said, a series of recent cases have experimented with an alternative
application of Rule 10b-5 to informed cyber-trading—one that characterizes
the conduct not strictly as a species of insider trading, but rather as a hybrid
with conventional securities fraud, in which the cyber-traders make use of a
“deceptive device” in relation to securities transactions.99 Because it leans
on a conventional fraud claim, this extension dispenses with the burden of
demonstrating the breach (or even the existence) of any fiduciary relationship. That said, it is a “[f]ar more complex and challenging” theory of liability for government regulators to pursue.100 Under several accountings, the
government’s theory represents a new paradigm of unlawful “outsider trading” under Rule 10b-5 to reach “a third and new category of securities miscreant — ‘outsiders’ — who do not work for (or with) the company, and
who do not owe a duty to anyone.”101 This new category aims to capture
trading on the basis of MNPI obtained via computer hacking in situations
(like Scenarios I and II), lacking the fiduciary relationship required by insider trading law, but still reflecting the requisite degree of deception.
Should courts prove receptive to this theory, it could certainly represent a
bona fide threat of securities fraud exposure against a trader in Scenario I
who coordinates with a hacker to detect or trade on stolen data.
But what would a new theory of outsider trading look like? While the
idea is still in nascent stages of development, the SEC has theorized that
cyber-trading “outsiders” can nonetheless be culpable under Rule 10b-5
when, as part of the hack, they “are masquerading as company insiders. . ..”102 In other words, under this theory, the deception element mandated
by Rule 10b-5 relates “directly to the hacking or unauthorized computer
access and is a bit more attenuated from the securities transaction.”103 Note
that coordination between the hacker and trader envisaged by Scenarios I
and II (in the form of a common plan, scheme, or transaction) appears to be
critical to this theory as well; for without such coordinated efforts (for exam97

See Stark, supra note 81.
Steinbuch, supra note 89, at 589 (“Conventional wisdom had held that mere thieves
cannot be liable for trading on stolen confidential information because they lack a fiduciary
relationship to the source of the information and, therefore, do not deceive that source.”).
99
SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100
See Stark, supra note 81.
101
See Stark, supra note 81.
102
See Stark, supra note 81.
103
See Stark, supra note 81.
98
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ple, the hacker and trader acting independently), it would be difficult to say
that the deceptive hack was also “in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security” requirement, another critical requirement of Rule 10b-5.104
The emerging theory of outsider trading bears a strong resemblance to
Donald Langevoort’s development of the idea that “intentional deception”
should serve as a trigger for securities fraud liability, arguing that “[s]o
long as an element of intentional deception was present in the action, the
resulting trading would seem to satisfy the ‘in connection with’ requirement
and lead to liability under Rule 10b-5.”105 Propounding the normative desirability of this test, Langevoort concludes, “[T]here is little reason to believe
that gaining a trading advantage by deceptive theft is any less deserving of
proscription under Rule 10b-5 than gaining a trading advantage by a secretive breach of fiduciary duty.”106
While the outsider trading model remains a relatively untested prototype, the SEC has asserted facially similar charges against several outsider
trading defendants for years.107 A decade ago, in SEC v. Dorozhko,108 the
SEC had its best (and sole) opportunity thus far to establish a beachhead for
outsider trading theory. In Dorozhko, the Second Circuit confronted the
question of “whether, in a civil enforcement lawsuit brought by the [SEC]
under Section 10(b) of the [’34 Act], computer hacking may be ‘deceptive’
where the hacker did not breach a fiduciary duty in fraudulently obtaining
[MNPI] used in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.”109 In the
case, the SEC alleged that Dorozhko hacked into the computer network of an
investor relations and web-hosting company to access unreleased earnings
reports for IMS Health, Inc., which indicated that the company would miss
its expected earnings, and subsequently traded on this MNPI through the
purchase of put options.110 The Southern District of New York found that
Dorozhko’s behavior “might be fraudulent and might violate a number of
federal and state criminal statutes,” but that his behavior did not violate
Section 10(b) because Dorozhko did not owe a fiduciary duty to either the
web-hosting company or to the hacked company.111 Accordingly, it denied

104

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND PREVENTION § 6:14; see also United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“O’Hagan ‘s [sic] requirement that the misappropriated information ‘ordinarily’ be valuable
due to ‘its utility in securities trading,’. . .appears to be a more generally applicable factor in
determining whether section 10(b)’s ‘in connection with’ requirement is satisfied. That requirement is met in a case where, as here, the misappropriated information is a magazine column
that has a known effect on the prices of the securities of the companies it discusses.”) (quoting
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1033 (1986)).
106
Langevoort, supra note 105.
107
See e.g., Stark, supra note 81 (discussing SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd., SEC v. Lohmus
Haavel & Viisemann, and SEC v. Stummer).
108
SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 43–44 (2d Cir. 2009).
109
Id.
110
Id. at 44.
111
Id. at 45.
105
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the SEC’s request for a preliminary injunction freezing Dorozhko’s trading
account.112
A unanimous three-judge panel on the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the Southern District of New York.113 Acknowledging
that the SEC’s claim was “not based on either of the two generally accepted
theories of insider trading,” Judge Cabranes’ opinion noted that the complaint was “nonetheless based on a claim of fraud” and accorded “attention
to whether this fraud is ‘deceptive’ within the meaning of Section 10(b).”114
Notably, the Second Circuit explained that “what is sufficient [to establish a
breach of Section 10(b)] is not always what is necessary.”115 Because
Dorozhko’s actions—hacking to gain access to and trade on MNPI—allegedly constituted an “affirmative misrepresentation” (as opposed to “silence
or nondisclosure”),116 and because violation of the “affirmative misrepresentation is a distinct species of fraud,” the Second Circuit held that he could be
liable under the antifraud rules despite the absence of a fiduciary
relationship.117
Having made the general point that a fiduciary relationship is not necessary under Section 10(b), the Second Circuit remanded the case to decide the
fact-specific question of “whether the computer hacking in this case. . .as
opposed to computer hacking in general. . .involved a fraudulent misrepresentation that was ‘deceptive’ within the ordinary meaning of Section
10(b).”118 In doing so, the opinion gave guidance regarding the ordinary
meaning of “deceptive,” which “covers a wide spectrum of conduct involving cheating or trading in falsehoods” and “‘irreducibly entails some act
that gives the victim a false impression.’” 119 The Court infused ambiguity
into its (otherwise clear) opinion by stating, “In our view, misrepresenting
one’s identity in order to gain access to information that is otherwise off
limits, and then stealing that information is plainly ‘deceptive’ within the
ordinary meaning of the word. It is unclear, however, that exploiting a weakness in an electronic code to gain unauthorized access is ‘deceptive,’ rather
than being mere theft.” 120 Thus, the Second Circuit asked the District Court
to take a deeper dive into “how the hacker gained access” in order to determine whether the actions constituted “a ‘deceptive device or contrivance’
that is prohibited by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b– 5.”121 Unfortunately (at
least for us), the Second Circuit panel’s invitation in Dorozhko was never
formally taken up by the District Court on remand: Dorozhko’s attorney lost
112

Id.
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
113

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

51.
45.
49.
48–49.
49.
51.
50 (quoting United States v. Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2008)).
51 (emphasis added).
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contact with his client and the trial court later granted summary judgment for
the SEC.122
A fair reading of the opinion nevertheless suggests that trading on
hacked information might constitute actionable securities fraud, but only if
accompanied by some manifested deception on behalf of the hacker. According to one prominent commentator “hacking might not be a securities
fraud if, for instance, it was based on discovering weaknesses in software
rather than, a deception, such as a hacker using hijacked employee credentials.”123 Thus, while negligently weak computer systems that “leav[e] a
virtual door open for an online intruder” might not open the door to “deception,” the use of malware and the tools and processes more generally associated with the popular perception of hackers might suffice.124 Regulators and
courts will no doubt grapple with defendants about where to draw this line,
should outsider trading theory gain a greater jurisprudential following.
Dorozhko’s unrequited invitation for doctrinal development is just one
reason why Dubovoy represents a potential watershed moment for informed
cyber-trading under federal securities law. The Dubovoy pleadings are instructive, and they clearly evince the government’s deep familiarity with the
language in Dorozhko, and its attempt to squeeze the underlying allegations
within its ambit. For example, The SEC’s complaint alleges that the Dubovoy
Hackers used deception as follows.
The hacker defendants used deceptive means to gain unauthorized
access to the Newswire Services’ computer systems, using tactics
such as: (a) employing stolen username/password information of
authorized users to pose as authorized users; (b) deploying malicious computer code designed to delete evidence of the computer
attacks; (c) concealing the identity and location of the computers
used to access the Newswire Services’ computers; and (d) using
back-door access-modules.125
Moreover, the SEC’s initial complaint alleges that the Dubovoy Traders
deceptively concealed their activities through shell entities, misleading payments,126 multiple trading accounts,127 and a secure server.128

122

Stark, supra note 81.
Id. (interpreting Dorozhko).
124
Id.
125
Complaint at ¶ 71, SEC v. Dubovoy, No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH (D.N.J., filed
August 10, 2015); Stark, supra note 81.
126
Complaint at ¶ 84, Dubovoy, No. 2:15-cv-06076-MCA-MAH (“The Dubovoy Group
defendants attempted to conceal the illegal payments by sending them from Tanigold Assets,
one of Arkadiy Dubovoy’s companies, and mislabeling them as payments for ‘technological
equipment’ and ‘building equipment.’”).
127
Id. at ¶ 91 (“The Dubovoy Group defendants tried to conceal their fraud by deceptively
spreading their illicit trading across numerous accounts at more than 10 brokerage firms in the
names of various individuals and entities. Through this strategy, they hoped to avoid detection
by brokers, regulators, and law enforcement.”).
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Based on the preliminary opinions thus far produced in the case, it appears courts have been sympathetic to outsider-trader theory.129 For example,
in the Amaryan Opinion, without specifically elaborating on the legal standard required by Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, the district court suggests that
“the evidence submitted by the SEC raises a strong inference that the
Amaryan Defendants violated federal securities laws.”130 And, even more
recently, the SEC obtained a default judgment against several trading defendants on highly similar facts. In SEC v Iat Hong, several traders were
charged with hacking into a law firm (by installing malware and compromising accounts that enabled access to law firm email accounts) and fraudulently trading on MNPI.131 In the default judgment, the judge concluded that
the evidence “sufficiently demonstrates that Defendants directly, indirectly,
or through or by means of others, hacked into the nonpublic networks of two
New York-headquartered law firms and stole, through deception, confidential information covering several publicly traded companies” and then
“reaped illegal profits by trading on the stolen [MNPI]” in violation of
Sections 10(b) and 20(b) of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, among
other securities laws.132
Notwithstanding its evident traction in judicial opinions, outsider trading theory has attracted a chorus of critics decrying its many alleged infirmities. Many of them have been wary of a significant expansion of insider
trading based on an amorphous concept of deception and have instead argued that misappropriation theory can capture many of the most concerning
hacker-trader conspiracies.133 Others have lodged even stronger opposition to
the concept of liability for outsiders under the antifraud provisions, arguing

128
Id. at ¶ 85 (“Pavel Dubovoy provided instructions, which informed the reader how to
log in to the server and download files and advised users to conceal the identity of the computer they used to access the server.”).
129
See e.g., SEC v. Dubovoy, No. CV 15-6076, 2016 WL 5745099, at *4–5 (D.N.J. Sept.
29, 2016) (suggesting that (i) “The scheme alleged in the Amended Complaint is a complex
one, involving a number of individuals, entities, and straw owners who worked together to
perpetrate a complex, high-tech fraud.”; (ii ) “These circumstances also support a strong inference that Memelland acted with scienter,” where “‘[s]cienter is a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud,’ and can be established by showing recklessness”;
and (iii) “Memelland’s sophistication, the temporal proximity of its trades to the publication of
the press releases, the similarity of its trading pattern to other Trader Defendants with conspicuous ties to the Hacker Defendants, its shared IP channels with the Dubovoy Group, and the
fact that the stolen press releases contained financial information that had not yet been reported
in the news all strongly support an inference that Memelland intended to participate in the
fraud.”) (quoting SEC v. Infinity Grp. Co., 212, F.3d 180, 192 (3d Cir. 2000).
130
SEC v. Dubovoy, No. CV 15-6076, 2015 WL 6122261, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2015).
131
Default Judgment at ¶ 11, SEC v. Hong, No. 1:16-CV-09947 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2017)
(Bloomberg Law).
132
Id. (emphasis added).
133
Steinbuch, supra note 89, at 594–95 (“O’Hagan and its progeny should not be read as
requiring a fiduciary relationship under the misappropriation theory. Both the underlying purpose of the misappropriation theory and courts’ interpretation of it demonstrate that the theory
encompasses the acts of nonfiduciaries.”).
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that the new theory opens an unwieldy and unnecessary Pandora’s Box.134
Andrew Vollmer, for example, has argued that “[t]he government had the
ability to charge one or more reasonable and appropriate crimes against the
hacker and trader defendants but reached out too far to include securities
fraud.”135 And, even sympathetic judicial opinions (such as Dorozhko) have
held that computer hackers do not typically commit insider trading and do so
only if they employ deception in their hack and such deception ultimately
gives rise to trading.136 When either is absent, a hacker’s actions are too far
removed from the trading to be considered “in connection with” the
purchase or sale of securities.137
More generally, whatever one’s opinion is about outsider trading theory, with or without it the overall fit of securities fraud law to informed
cyber-trading appears far from perfect. It is all but obvious that conventional
insider trading models (classical and misappropriation) are ill-equipped to
deal with cyber-traders. By requiring a fiduciary-like relationship with either
the company or a third-party owner of MNPI, the classical and misappropriation theories simply fall flat by focusing on factors that have questionable
normative relevance here. The emerging theory of outsider trading—to the
extent it has traction—is a slightly better fit, but hardly a bespoke one. On
the one hand, the theory would seem to require some type of coordination
between the hacker and the trader (as in the top row of Table 11), consistent
with our normative analysis. Yet, by hinging an offence on an affirmative
deception by the hacker, outsider trading theory fails to capture an important
subset of problematic informed cyber-trading, where the hacker/trader team
are “merely guileless thieves,” utilizing brazen (but not deceptive) means to
access unauthorized information. Hence, even if outsider trading theory
gains jurisprudential traction (a long-shot proposition in its own right), securities law would remain substantially under-inclusive relative to the normative challenge at issue.138
B. Liability Under the CFAA
If securities law stumbles in the task of addressing problematic normative issues surrounding informed cyber-trading, what might succeed? The
134
Andrew Vollmer, Computer Hacking and Securities Fraud, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(Apr. 7, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/04/07/computer-hacking-and-securities-fraud/ (“The recent computer hacking cases are important because they create dangers
from over-zealous pursuit of securities law violations . . . . Some bad acts are not securities
fraud.”).
135
Id.
136
SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
137
Vollmer, supra note 134.
138
It is certainly possible that the definition of deceptive may be expanded even further to
entail not only affirmative misrepresentations but also “digital trespassing” (unauthorized access to data), or alternatively a violation of some other statutory fraud proscription (such as the
CFAA). Such a reform, however, would be an even more profound break from existing
jurisprudence.
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criminal indictment of the Dubovoy Traders provides a possible clue, in a
charge that many would find more esoteric: violation of the CFAA.139 Although not within the regulatory remit of the SEC, the CFAA has both criminal and civil enforcement mechanisms that might, in theory, be better
adapted tools for the normative task at hand.
Originally promulgated in 1986 (and expanded through amendment
several times since), the CFAA prohibits essentially three categories of conduct: (1) using unauthorized access to fraudulently acquire valuable information from a computer; (2) causing damage through the unauthorized
transmission of computer passwords; and (3) causing unauthorized damage
to computer data or causing damage to a computer.140 Although the liability
provisions of the CFAA are quite general, they tend to concentrate actions
whereby one accesses a “protected computer,” either “without authorization” or in a manner that “exceeds authorized access.”141
The term “protected computer” refers not to the level of security protocols that protect the compromised data, but rather to the intended use of the
compromised computer. Under the CFAA, this definition includes any computer that is used (i) by/for the federal government, (ii) “[by/for]” a financial institution,” or (iii) “in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”142
These categories have been interpreted broadly. For example, courts have
read the “interstate commerce” flag to be triggered by the use of any computer connected to the Internet—regardless of whether the computer is located inside or outside the United States—as affecting interstate
commerce.143
The elements of the CFAA that concern “authorization” tend to subdivide defendants into two groups: “outsiders”—third parties with no affiliation with the target and enjoying no authorization to access the protected
content, and “insiders”— parties (such as employees, customers, and contractors) who, pursuant to some relationship with the target, have (or previ139

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018).
See Audra Dial & Daniel G. Schulof, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: An Underutilized Litigation Weapon, https://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/~/media/Files/articles/A
Dial%20DSchulof%20Technology%20Litigation%20Desk%20Reference_The%20Computer
%20Fraud%20and%20Abuse%20Act.ashx. The precise contours of the CFAA are slightly
broader. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2018).
141
OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUCATION EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS,
PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES (June 2013).
142
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (2018).
143
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2018) (amending the CFAA to include Internet-connected
computers outside the US); see also United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007)
(“No additional interstate nexus is required when instrumentalities or channels of interstate
commerce are regulated.”); United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 457 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
(“[T]he latter two elements of the section 1030(a)(2)(C) crime [obtaining information from a
protected computer] will always be met when an individual using a computer contacts or
communicates with an Internet website.”); Paradigm All., Inc. v. Celeritas Tech., LLC, 248
F.R.D. 598, 602 (D. Kan. 2008) (“As a practical matter, a computer providing a ‘web-based’
application accessible through the internet would satisfy the ‘interstate communication’
requirement.”).
140
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ously had) some limited authorization to access data, but transgressed that
authorization on the date of the breach.144 Interestingly, the CFAA tends to
treat insiders who exceed their authorization with some degree of deference,
requiring actual intent by the insider to damage the computer for liability to
follow.145 Outsiders are subject to less accommodation and may be found
liable for intentional, reckless or other damage caused by their digital trespass.146 In recent years, moreover, some courts have been willing to convert
insiders into outsiders—stripping them of their more protected status—when
the insider breaches its duty of loyalty to the target, such as when the insider
pursues interests antithetical to the interests of the target.147
The CFAA insider/outsider distinction—augmented by the aforementioned fiduciary breach conversion—stands in stark contrast with Rule 10b5’s insider trading doctrine (as discussed above).148 In 10b-5 actions, the liability standard aggressively scrutinizes insiders who breach a fiduciary duty
to access data, but it develops a case of “alligator arms” vis-à-vis outsiders,
even under the nascent outsider trading theory (which still hinges awkwardly
on deception by the hacker). Thus, at least on this critical dimension, the
CFAA seems to be a significantly better fit for addressing informed cybertrading.
On the other hand, CFAA liability is far clunkier than securities law in
engaging other challenges, such as the degree of coordination between the
hacker and trader. Recall that securities fraud exposure tends to “scale
down” when the hacker and trader are completely independent from one
another, since the deceptive hack is remote from and thus arguably not “in
connection with” the purchase and sale of securities.149 This retrenchment
seems normatively justified, since the lack of coordination substantially
reduces the danger that cyber-trading activity subsidizes hacking and defensive activity. Under the CFAA, in contrast, the relevance of coordinated activity fades (at least for the hacker). Although a trader who operates
independent of the hacker can probably avoid CFAA liability, the hacker’s
exposure does not appear to change.150

144
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (2018) (establishing CFAA liability if a party “knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceed[ed] authorized access . . . .”).
145
United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2007).
146
Id. at 219 (referencing legislative history).
147
See e.g., Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006);
Ervin & Smith Advert. & Pub. Relations, Inc. v. Ervin, 2009 WL 249998, at *8 (D. Neb.
2009); NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1060 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (“[T]he
determinative question is whether Artino breached his duty of loyalty to NCMIC when Artino
obtained information from NCMIC’s computers.”); ViChip Corp. v. Lee, 438 F. Supp. 2d
1087, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119
F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
148
See supra Part IV.A.
149
See supra Part II.A.
150
See Dial & Schulof, supra note 140, at 57–58 (discussing the flexibility and generality
of the CFAA in going after hackers relative to other potential theories).
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A second area of misfit concerns the civil provisions of the CFAA, and
in particular the measure of damages available to private parties. Although
the CFAA provides civil remedies (both injunctive and in damages) for persons injured by unauthorized access or computer fraud, the level of monetary damages available has historically been quite limited. Under the CFAA,
monetary relief is explicitly limited to economic damages.151 Moreover, most
courts interpreting the statute have measured economic damages against the
CFAA’s definition of “loss,” which equals “any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage
assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its
condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other
consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.”152 An
obvious limitation to this provision is that consequential damages (including
stock price fall) associated with the breach must be related to an interruption
of service. In cases where a data breach simply results in the unauthorized
access or downloading of data with no “service interruption,” such consequential losses may be unavailable.153 In the absence of a significant broadening of this interpretation, it seems unlikely that private parties will pursue
civil CFAA litigation vigorously against informed cyber-traders; most of the
work will be left to criminal enforcement.
This last observation raises a final shortcoming of CFAA liability: the
relative absence of regulatory expertise for the DOJ to draw upon in pursuing CFAA claims against informed cyber-traders. As noted above, federal
prosecutors have long enjoyed a secret weapon in their securities fraud prosecutions (including insider trading): a sophisticated and motivated regulator
in the SEC, possessing an ample budget, years of expertise, and well-trained
staff and attorneys capable of unpacking often dense and complicated transactions.154 Indeed, the SEC and DOJ actively tout their cooperation and the
latter’s reliance on the former’s expertise in many complicated fraud prosecutions. CFAA claims, in contrast, are outside of the SEC’s remit and do not
come with a built-in regulator to assist with uncovering the key facts.

151

18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2018).
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (2018).
153
See Nexans Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc., 166 F. App’x 559, 562–63 (2nd Cir. 2006)
(holding that plaintiff’s claim for lost revenue due to defendant’s misappropriation of its confidential data did not constitute a cognizable loss under the CFAA “[b]ecause it is undisputed
that no interruption of service occurred in this case”); John DiGiacomo, Civil Actions Under
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, REVISION LEGAL (Feb. 4, 2015), https://revisionlegal.com/
internet-lawyer/civil-actions-computer-fraud-abuse-act/#_ftnref23. But see EF Cultural Travel
BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 585 (1st Cir. 2001) (observing that—in an “increasingly
electronic world”—the CFAA covers more than just the cost of physical damage and may also
include “the value to the victim of what has been stolen and the victim’s costs in shoring up its
security features”). In contrast, private actions under securities law generally give a plaintiff
(here, target stockholders who traded during the fraud) a full measure of loss, which—given
the nature of the transaction—tends to coincide with the informed trader’s gain from the trade.
154
See White, supra note 76.
152
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C. Synopsis
Given the discussion above, the battle between Rule 10b-5 and the
CFAA as a legal theory for scrutinizing informed cyber-traders yields no
clear-cut victor. On the one hand, the CFAA is far more flexible and less
statutorily-ossified than Rule 10b-5—where fiduciary duty and deception requirements severely constrain enforcement modalities. That said, the CFAA
appears less able to tailor itself to coordinated hacker-trader schemes—it
has unattractive civil damages provisions, and it has no built-in regulator to
lend expertise to criminal prosecutors in investigating and pursuing
claims.155
In short, both approaches fall short, and neither appears to lend itself to
an obvious and simple fix. Certain forms of tinkering around the edges
might be possible, of course. Proponents of outsider trading theory, for example, may attempt to push for an even more capacious definition of deceptive—one that includes (say) willful and deliberate access to data that the
hacker knows or has reason to know is unauthorized (“digital trespassing”).
Given the tenuous state of flux that outsider trading theory finds itself in,
however, this strategy carries obvious risks. Alternatively, proponents of
CFAA enforcement might push courts to expand their construction of consequential damages, granting private claimants greater license to recover economic losses (including those capitalized through lower equity prices). Here
too, however, the statutory definitions in the CFAA make such a construction a heavy lift in the absence of statutory amendment.
To the extent that one considers systematic statutory reform, it is necessary to remember that information trading is a complex, normative landscape. Simply because there are idiosyncratic dangers associated with
informed cyber-trading, it does not follow that all such trading is undesirable. As with any other type of informed trading, cyber-trading can convey
information through price, to both market participants and to the targets of
hacking themselves. Any substantive reform to either securities law or the
CFAA must remain mindful of this tension. One intriguing possibility—
which we develop in a technical companion to this paper —would broadly
prohibit informed cyber-trading (along the CFAA model), but would simultaneously exempt initial arbitrage “allowance” (that is, a monetary cap or a
fraction of the firm’s economic heft) shielded from both criminal fines and
civil recovery.156 This allowance would serve as a type of “bounty” for
bringing the information to light. Once the exemption level is met, however,
the trader would be required to adhere to a “disclose or abstain” duty, refraining from trading on the information until it has disclosed the information to the targeted issuer and the market. If the size of the exemption is
calibrated reasonably, this alternative approach would have the benefits of
155
156

See supra Part IV.B.
See Mitts & Talley, supra note 58.
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(1) preserving price discovery (at least within the limits of the exemption);
(2) preserving limited incentives to uncover information about vulnerability;
and (3) catalyzing communication to the issuer about the nature of the vulnerability, so as to streamline both the hacker’s offensive efforts and the
issuer’s precautionary measures. Although we see much to commend this
prescriptive course from an economic policy perspective, we confess that it
would be a difficult change to effect under current law.157
Short of such systematic statutory reforms, however, perhaps the most
expedient strategy would be to continue some version of the status quo,
where the DOJ has nominal authority to bring enforcement actions under
either Rule 10b-5 or the CFAA, but it can more effectively enlist the SEC’s
investigatory assistance to help develop and focus its claims. No doubt some
investigations will come up dry in uncovering actionable securities fraud
claims, but such cases will usually not announce themselves ex ante, effectively rationalizing the SEC’s coordinated involvement (at least early on).
Where a securities fraud claim proves viable (such as in an outsider trading
case involving hacker deception), the SEC and DOJ can continue to pursue a
coordinated strategy, much as they do today. Where it does not, the SEC will
have to back away, leaving the government to pursue a criminal CFAA
claim should it choose, but with the benefit of the SEC’s past factual
investigation.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the phenomenon of informed cyberhacking, whereby market arbitrageurs learn of material, yet-to-be-disclosed
cybersecurity breaches and execute trades in advance of the public disclosure. We have demonstrated empirically that such practices appear manifest
in the derivatives market trading, where breach-disclosing firms exhibit significantly larger open interest and trading volume in put options (relative to
a variety of control groups) in advance of the disclosure. Our results, moreover, are robust to a variety of alternative specifications and identification
strategies. We have also argued that such market activity raises certain idiosyncratic normative concerns, potentially justifying more capacious exposure to liability for hacker/traders in response to such concerns. Under
current law, however, it seems unlikely that such an expansion is possible
without substantial legal and statutory reform. Recent endeavors to expand
insider trading to outsiders (including hacker-traders) who use deception to
breach a firm’s cybersecurity system may be warranted, though not a perfect
157
Difficult, but perhaps not impossible. The requirement of deception could be met by
labeling cooperation between hackers and traders as deceptive. Much of the damages jurisprudence in insider trading law is (and always has been) the product of precedential evolution.
Our analysis excludes the possibility of common law tort claims against an informed cybertrader, since such claims would have a difficulty establishing a duty by either the hacker or
trader, and may well be preempted by federal securities law anyway.
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fit for the policy concerns in play. Similarly, liability under the CFAA—
while not requiring deception or fraud— still suffers from deficits in investigatory expertise, monetary damages provisions, and appropriate tailoring for
securities market harms. In the short term, it will likely prove difficult to
nudge doctrine in a way that does not run the risk of being severely over-or
under-inclusive. In the absence of a more systematic reform (which could be
years away at best), the status quo (including a more developed and mature
doctrine of outsider trading) may be the most expedient—even if flawed—
response to informed cyber-trading.
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